Thursday, February 7, 2019
Are Spinozistic Ideas Cartesian Judgements? :: Philosophy Philosophical Essays
Are Spinozistic Ideas Cartesian Judgements?AbstractSome commentators of de Spinoza maintain that Spinozistic thought processs be judgements. I shall plow this facial expression the common interpretation, since it is popular to interpret Spinoza as reacting against Descartess theory of ideas and accordingly consider Spinozistic ideas not as Cartesian ideas, alone as Cartesian judgements. The cle atomic number 18st difference between Descartes and Spinoza here is that whereas Descartes plan that ideas are passive, Spinoza thought the opposite. The notion of activity plays accordingly an important role in interpreting Spinozas theory of ideas. fit in to the common interpretation Spinoza and Descartes use the concept of activity in the same way. And since Descartes thought that judgements are active, it is maintained that the Spinozistic, active ideas are care Cartesian judgements. I find that the considerations according to which the activity of Spinozistic ideas is seen in th e gentle of Descartess distinction between action and passion are found on too superficial an interpretation of Spinoza. I argue that what Spinoza means by pleading that ideas are active does not entirely mean that they are active in a Cartesian sense. He has in mind something additional to the mere Cartesian activity. Whereas Spinoza wants to say that active ideas incorporate the property of truth or certainty, Descartes does not retrieve in that way about judgements. Thus, the Spinozistic ideas can be called truth-expressing. IntroductionRen Descartes brought the concept of idea into a central place in epistemology. Another famous rationalistBenedictus de Spinozamade use of the same term idea, but had an entirely different view concerning the nature of ideas. Whereas Descartes thought that ideas are passive, Spinoza had the opposite view according to which ideas are active. In this write up I shall examine what Spinoza means by the activity of ideas. correspond to some com mentators Spinozistic ideas should be seen as Cartesian judgements. I call this view the common interpretation and I shall argue that it does not capture the exclusively of Spinozas theory of active ideas. The activity of Spinozistic ideas is something more than scarce the kind of activity found in Cartesian judgements. In the depression part I result sketch Descartes conception of ideas as passive. In the second and third part I move on the summary Spinozas position and point out that there are passages which motivate the common interpretation. In the fourth part I will proceed to argue that the activity of Spinozistic ideas is not merely that of Cartesian judgements.